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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT:
PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN A PRIVATE CONTEXT-
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District, 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979).
Early in 1979 the United States Supreme Court rendered a deci-
sion which, like many first amendment cases, is more far-reaching
than would appear at first reading. The case, Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District,' held that expressions of a public
employee which are made in a private context are protected by the
first amendment. The significance of the case, however, lies more in
the negative; that is, in what it prevents rather than what it pro-
nounces. This comment will examine Givhan in light of the existing
body of law on which it impacts.
THE PUBUC EMPLOYEE AND FREE SPEECH IN A PUBLIC FORUM
The public employee was, until relatively recently, no better off
than his private employee counterpart in relation to his constitutional
rights. Courts had held that a state could terminate a public employee
at will, in the same way a private employee may be terminated.2 That
view was expressed as early as 1892 by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
famous statement that, "The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech... by the
implied terms of his contract." ' That statement constitutes the foun-
dation of the old right-privilege distinction, which has held on until
relatively recently. Although eroded to some extent,' the practice of
conditioning public employment on the surrender of constitutional
rights was not clearly rejected by the Supreme Court until 1967 in
'99 S. Ct. 693 (1979).
'See generally Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches
On, 57 CEO. L.J. 134 (1968); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.R. 1404 (1967). But see
Holloway, Fired Employees Challenging Terminable-at-Will Doctrine, The Nat. Law J.,
Feb. 19, 1979, at 22, col. 1 (indicates that private employees are also making inroads
into the terminable-at-will doctrine).
'McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
'See generally Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) and Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375 (1962) (extending first amendment privileges to public employees speaking
publicly on matters of public concern); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) and
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (striking down loyalty oaths). See also Note,
The Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MICH. L. REV. 365
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression]; Note, The First
Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 CEO. L.J. 134 (1968).
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Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' The right-privilege distinction,
however, lived on. In Illinois, a public school teacher, Pickering, sent
a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the revenue raising practices
of the school board. He was dismissed when the school board deter-
mined that publication of the letter had lead to disruption in the
operation and administration of the school. The school board found
that the statements were false, but considered no evidence on the ques-
tion of disruption. Instead the board based its decision on the old
right-privilege distinction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal.6 On appeal the United States Supreme Court re-affirmed
Keyishian and established what has become known as the Pickering'
balancing test to determine when dismissal of a public employee for
speech-related behavior may be justified. The Court reasoned that
while it could not generally be said that the state had a significantly
greater interest in regulating the speech of its employees than it does
in regulating the speech of the public in general, the state does have an
interest in the efficiency of the public service it performs. Therefore,
the Court held that "[the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public -services it per-
forms through its employees."'s
Mr. Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, said that one factor
to consider when applying the balancing test is the relationship be-
tween the employee-speaker and the supervisor criticized. If there is
no close working relationship between the two, then actual disruption
due to a resultant discipline or loyalty problem is not as likely to arise
as when a more intimate relationship is required.' The Court held that
another factor to consider was whether Pickering's statement was
clearly concerning an issue of public interest.' 0 While part of his state-
ment was false, it was not shown that the false statement was care-
lessly made nor any actual disruption occurred as a result." The
'385 U.S. 589 (1967). Care should be taken, however, not to over generalize the con-
cept of unconstitutional conditions, as they have been called, Non-Partisan Freedom of
Expression, supra note 4, at 367 n. 7; remembering that constitutional rights are not ab-
solute, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); and that the first amendment rights of public employees remain subject to
regulation, e.g.: The Hatch Act which established restrictions on the political activities
of public employees, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1966).
'Pickering v. Board of Education, 36 Iii. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967).





"Id. at 573. The Court applied New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
But see 391 U.S. at 574, n. 6, where the Court declined to decide the issue of whether the
first amendment would protect statements that were knowingly or recklessly false and
also had harmful effects.
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Court, therefore, ruled that under the circumstances Pickering had
just as much right to speak out as any member of the general public. ,2
In 1972 another United States Supreme Court case made a major
statement concerning the free speech rights of public employees, par-
ticularly teachers. Perry v. Sindermann" involved Sindermann, a
teacher at a Texas state junior college which had no tenure system. He
had been a teacher in the state college system for ten years, employed
for four years at the junior college. He became involved in public
disagreements with the board of regents and on one occasion his name
was printed in conjunction with a newspaper advertisement which
was highly critical of the board. At the end of the year in which the
advertisement had been published, the board voted not to renew his
contract, but provided him with neither the reason for his termination
nor an opportunity for a hearing. When he brought suit, the district
court granted a summary judgment in favor of the school, holding
that because Sindermann had no tenure, he had no cause of action.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, 4 saying that despite his
non-tenured status, the non-renewal of his contract "would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if it in fact was based on his protected free
speech," and "the failure to allow him an opportunity for a hearing
would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process
if [he) could show that he had an 'expectancy' of reemployment."'I s
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
decision, but disagreed that a "mere subjective 'expectancy' '" would
be protected by due process.'" In view of its decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth," the Court held that while Sindermann was not re-
quired to be tenured in order to demonstrate a "property interest" in
his job, he did have to prove and should be given an opportunity to
prove, an "actual expectancy" which could arise by implication.'
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle"
"Id. at 574-75.
"408 U.S. 593 (1972).
"Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972).
"Id. at 603.
"408 U.S. 564 (1972).
The Supreme Court considered the Roth case along with Perry and rendered judgments
on both cases the same day. Perry summed up Roth as holding "that the Constitution
does not require opportunity for a hearing before the nonrenewal of a nontenured
teacher's contract, unless he can show that the decision not to rehire him somehow
deprived him of an interest in 'liberty' or that he had a 'property' interest in continued
employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract." Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. at 599.
"s408 U.S. 603. In view of the fact that Sindermann had been employed with the
state college system for so long and because evidence was presented which showed the
possibility of a de facto tenure program, the Supreme Court felt that this was a genuine
issue of fact, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599-600.
1"429 U.S. 274 (1977) (unanimous decision).
19791
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rounds out the trilogy of cases establishing the guidelines for permissi-
ble dismissal of public employees for constitutionally protected
behavior. Doyle, an untenured teacher at a public school, had pre-
viously been involved in several incidents at the school, but the last in-
cident, a phone call to a local radio station in which he conveyed the
substance of a memorandum from the principal concerning a dress
code for teachers, was the only one to involve his first amendment
rights. A month after the phone call, the principal recommended that
Doyle's contract not be renewed. Doyle requested a statement of
reasons for his termination and the reply cited, "a notable lack of tact
in handling professional matters which leaves much doubt as to your
sincerity in establishing good school relationships," 0 followed by
references to the phone call and another incident in which he had
allegedly made an obscene gesture toward two female students. The
district court"1 held that the phone call clearly came under the protec-
tion of the first amendment, and as it had played a "substantial part"
in the decision not to rehire even in the face of other permissible
grounds, Doyle should be reinstated with back pay.2 2 The court of ap-
peals affirmed. 23
The Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy cited Pickering and Perry, but
went one step further saying:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected con-
duct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,
could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he
done nothing .... The constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently
vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if
he had not engaged in the conduct."
The Court found this to be particularly true in Doyle's situation as a
decision to rehire him would have awarded him tenure. The Court
then established a two-part causation test which has become known as
the "same decision anyway" test, wherein the burden is first placed
on the employee to show that he engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct and such conduct was a substantial factor in the decision not
to rehire. Then the burden shifts to the employer to show "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same deci-




"1429 U.S. at 283.
"Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Board of Education, 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.
1975).
"1429 U.S. at 285-86.
"Id. at 287.
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GIVHAN AND THE PRIVATE EXPRESSION
While Pickering, Perry, and Mt. Healthy establish the basic tests
for determining when a public employee may be subject to sanctions
for speech related behavior, each case arose out of factual situations
in which the speech occurred in a public forum. In that respect,
Givhan differed.
Bessie Givhan was an untenured, black junior high school teacher
employed by the Western Line Consolidated School District, a rural
district encompassing most of Washington County and some of Issa-
quena County, Mississippi. She was not rehired for the 1971-72
school year. In dismissing her, the school principal acknowledged
that she was a competent teacher, but complained primarily of her
"insulting and hostile attitude" and her "petty and unreasonable
demands."-26 Givhan sued"l arguing, among other things, that her
free-speech rights had been violated.
In attempting to justify her dismissal, the school board introduced,
among other evidence, "s details from "private" conversations be-
tween Givhan and the school principal in which her allegedly "petty
and unreasonable demands ' '2  had been made. The district court
found that Givhan's demands were neither petty nor unreasonable as
"Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir. 1977).
"Western Line had been placed under a desegregation order, Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (Sth Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970), on re-
mand 425 F.2d 1211 (Sth Cir. 1970). The order required, inter alia, that the school
district develop and use objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards when
dismissing or demoting staff. Givhan was eventually allowed to intervene in the
desegregation order, but only after she had attempted a direct suit. Initially she and two
others filed suit in the District Court of the Northern District of Mississippi on their own
and on behalf of three classes of dischargees of Western Line. The district court dis-
missed the class action and one of the individual cases with prejudice, and allowed
Givhan and one other individual to intervene. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the cases
were treated separately; then on appeal to the Supreme Court, only the Givhan case was
considered. 99 S. Ct. at 695; 555 F.2d at 1311.
"School officials also sought to establish these other bases for their decision not to
rehire her:
(I) that Civhan 'downgraded' the papers of white students; (2) that she was one
of a number of teachers who walked out of a meeting about desegregation in the
fall of 1969 and attempted to disrupt it by blowing automobile horns outside the
gymnasium; (3) that the school district had received a threat by Givhan and
other teachers not to return to work when schools reopened on a unitary basis in
February, 1970; and (4) that Givhan had protected a student during a weapons
shakedown at Riverside in March, 1970, by concealing a student's knife until
completion of a search.
555 F.2d at 1313 n. 7.
The Fifth Circuit held that because the evidence on the first three points was in-
conclusive, the district judge did not clearly err in rejecting or ignoring it, and the court
said though Givhan admitted the fourth incident, the principal had not relied on it in
recommending that she not be rehired. Id.
"See note 22 and accompanying textual material, supra.
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they all involved employment practices and policies of the school
which Givhan believed were discriminatory. The district court said
her contract was not renewed primarily because of her criticism of
school policies and practices and therefore her dismissal violated her
first amendment rights. 30
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not find the district
court decision clearly erroneous, but reversed anyway, holding that
because her expressions were made in private conversations with her
principal, they were not protected by the first amendment.3 1
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on four grounds: 1) Pickering,
Perry, and Mt. Healthy implied that expressions made in a private
context were not protected by the first amendment; 2) there was no
contrary authority; 3) to protect such private expressions would place
public employers in the position of being a "captive audience," and
there is no constitutional right to "press even good 'ideas' on an un-
willing recipient";3" and 4) the school board failed to successfully
make a Mt. Healthy "same decision anyway" defense.3 3
In unanimously '* reversing and remanding the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion, the Supreme Court stated its position clearly; "The First Amend-
ment forbids abridgment of the 'freedom of speech.' Neither the
Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost
to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with
his employer rather than to spread his views before the public."3
The Court held that even though the decisions in Pickering, Perry,
and Mt. Healthy "arose in the context of a public employee's public
expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on that
largely coincidental fact. '' Therefore, the rules established by those
cases are to be applied to private as well as public expressions.
The Fifth Circuit's determination that there was no contrary
authority was simple error, and was possibly due to the fact that the
issue of public versus private speech was not briefed by the parties
prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision.3 7 The fact is that the Supreme
3*555 F.2d at 1311 (referring to the district court's unreported decision).
'555 F.2d at 1319-20.
"Id. at 1319.
"Id. at 1314-19.
"Justice Stevens concurred, but did not agree with the Court's handling of the Mt.
Healthy issue, arguing that as the district court concluded that Givhan's speech was the
primary reason for her termination, the Fifth Circuit could have regarded that deter-
mination as foreclosing the Mt. Healthy defense. Justice Stevens agreed, however, that
the district court should have an opportunity to hear further evidence on that subject.
but that the court should also be free not to do so if it feels an adequate record has
already been made. 99 S. Ct. at 697-98 (Stevens. J., concurring).
"s99 S. Ct. at 696-97.
"Id. at 696.
"Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en bane on Behalf of Appellee
Bessie B. Givhan at 5 n. 4. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309
(Sth Cir. 1977).
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Court itself had previously spoken to the issue in dicta,s" and several
circuits had found private speech to be within first amendment pro-
tection."
In disposing of the Fifth Circuit's "'captive audience" rationale,
the Supreme Court held simply that because the principal had opened
his office door to Givhan, he was hardly in a position to argue that he
was the unwilling recipient of her views.
4 0
The problem that arose in regard to the Mt. Healthy defense was
due to the fact that that decision was not handed down until after the
district court decision in Givhan, therefore, such a defense could not
be anticipated. In a note,4 the Supreme Court also suggested that
such a defense could possibly prove successful under the facts of
Givhan.
Upon a first consideration it seems surprising that the Supreme
Court had never heard a case in which such a basic issue as first
amendment protection for the public employee's private speech was
involved. However, it must be remembered that it has not been many
years since the demise of the right-privilege distinction, thus judicial
interpretation of public employee rights is still in its infancy.
Other factors may also have contributed to the absence of a deci-
sion on the issue; for example, the difficulty in determining when an
expression is public. Consider the case of Jannetta v. Cole,'2 where a
fireman circulated a petition, and after acquiring twenty-four
signatures, presented it to the city manager and to the fire chief. In a
footnote,'3 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined
that speech in a private context was involved since the petition was
presented to the fireman's employer. The court seemed to overlook the
fact that the petition had been read and signed by twenty-four other
persons.
An additional problem in this area may occur if a public employee
is involved in more than one incident before the decision to terminate
is made. The court would have to determine which incident was the
proximate cause of the termination. Prior to Mt. Healthy, this was a
very real problem. It is obvious that an expression made in a public
context is more apt to stimulate conflict than an expression made
"See Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973) in which the Supreme Court
held that nonprovocative expressions to a police officer are protected. See also Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977): "1E]very public employee is largely
free to express his views, in public or private, orally or in writing." Id. at 230.
3"See generally Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974): Jannetta v. Cole,
493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973): Simard
v. Board of Education, 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1972); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College
Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972).
"99 S. Ct. at 696.
"Id. at 697 n. 5.
"2493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974).
"4id. at 1337 n. 4.
1979]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
privately. Further, if other speech-related incidents are involved, the
importance of the privately-made expression is more likely to be
diminished when considered in relation to the other incidents in mak-
ing a decision whether to terminate. Indeed, in their brief to the
Supreme Court, respondents argued that the first amendment should
not have been an issue in Givhan, as many other non-speech related
incidents in which she had been involved demonstrated her lack of
loyalty.4
4
The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Givhan, that private expressions are
excluded from first amendment consideration because they have not
specifically been protected, is contrary to the basic theories of first
amendment interpretation.
In 1952 the Supreme Court declared that each method of expres-
sion presents "its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's com-
mand, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been
enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule.
' '
4
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights has been declared to have "penum-
bras ' ' " wherein "the concept of liberty protects those personal rights
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the
Bill of Rights.- 4 1 Possibly the most potent statement for inclusion of
private expressions in first amendment protection came from James
Madison who drafted the first amendment. In responding to Thomas
Tucker's proposal that the amendment should include language
specifically securing the right of the people to instruct their represen-
tatives, Madison said:
The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is ex-
pressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government, the people
may therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately ad-
vise them [emphasis added], or declare their sentiments by petition to
the whole body, in all these ways they may communicate their will.48
It therefore appears more likely that any form of expression is to
be considered protected by the first amendment unless specifically
declared otherwise.
Likewise, the idea that the Pickering Court did not intend to in-
clude privately expressed speech, is contrary to the entire Pickering
principle-that of avoidance of disruption. A reasonable person seek-
ing to avoid disruption would express his complaint privately rather
than publicly. Even if the Pickering Court didn't specifically speak
4Brief of Respondents at 13-20, Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.. 99 S.
Ct. 693 (1979).
45Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495. 503 (1952).
'6Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
"Id. at 486 (Goldberg. J., concurring).
"Brief for Petitioner at 14. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.. 99 S. Ct.
693 (1979) (quoting I ANN LS OF CONG. 766 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) ).
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directly to this point, it did plant a clue in a footnote,"O when it re-
served judgment on the question of whether a teacher could be re-
quired to take his grievance through private channels before going
public. Certainly the court would not have even considered such a re-
quirement without first presuming that the manner of communica-
tion was protected by the first amendment. Not only do the
authorities agree that private expressions are protected by the first
amendment, but in their brief to the Supreme Court in Givhan,
respondents joined with the petitioner on this point only, arguing that
the Fifth Circuit decision was in error.6 0
When the Fifth Circuit applied the captive audience concept in
Givhan it treated the idea as if it were an isolated one. Captive au-
dience is, however, a term used in the right to privacy area.
While the caselaw has dealt with several areas of privacy,"' the
majority of cases concern privacy in the home, 2 or the inability to
escape the intrusion of one's privacy if not in the home.'2 The privacy
concept is therefore very limited as the Supreme Court has said:
The ability of the government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words,
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections.'
4
The term captive audience appeared in the case of Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department,"" which pointed out "[t]hat we
are often 'captives' outside the ... home,"" indicating that captivity
"Pickering v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 563, 572 n. 4 (1968).
"Brief of Respondents at 3.
"See generally Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971);
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. III (1969) (residential picketing); Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (unwanted telephone calls and
mail); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (public address
systems and sound trucks); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (door to door solicitation); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285
U.S. 105 ( 932); Perlmutter v. Greene. 140 Misc. 42, 249 N.Y.S. 495 (1931), rev'd 259
N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5(1932) (billboards). See also Haiman, Speech v. Privacy, Is There a
Right Not to Be Spoken To? 67 Nw. U. L REV. 153 (1972).
"2See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
"Haiman, supra note 51, at 194.
"Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
Note also that expressions to persons in their home are private expressions. To this
author's knowledge, it has never been argued that these expressions were not protected
because they were private; they have been subject to regulations, however, because of
the right to privacy involved.
"5397 U.S. 728 (1970).
$OId. at 738.
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cannot always be avoided. But was Givhan's principal a captive au-
dience? The Supreme Court held that because he opened his office
door to her, he could not complain that he was unwilling to listen to
her viewss indicating that he might have had a right not to open his
door at that particular time. The Supreme Court has also indicated
that the first amendment does not command "'that people who want
to [voice their] views have a constitutional right to do so whenever
and wherever they please." 8 It follows that a public employer may
have a means of escaping from unwanted opinions, or at least putting
them off for a time, through the establishment of reasonable time,
place and manner regulations.59
Time, place and manner takes on another and greater significance
when dealing with private expressions. In a footnote to Givhan, the
Court pointed out that when an expression made in a public context is
involved, the content of the expression is focused upon to determine
the disruptive effect. Whereas in dealing with expressions in a private
context, the Court said that not only the content, but also the time,
place and manner of the expression may lead to disruption of institu-
tional efficiency." Therefore, the time, place and manner of private
expressions may be considered in a Pickering balance. To a degree,
this puts the burden on the employee to use common sense and his best
judgment to avoid disruption.
The word "private" in this analysis can be considered in two
distinct ways-private context, which has been the issue up to this
point, and private content. Whether a statement is made in a public or
a private context has to do with to whom the statement is made. But
whether the content of an expression is public or private has to do
with the subject matter of the expression-whether or not it concerns
a matter of public interest. From a combination of content and con-
text, four possible factual situations evolve:
1. Public context-public content
2. Public context-private content
3. Private context-public content
4. Private context-private content"'
The first three of these categories are at least, since Givhan, clearly
protected by the first amendment. Whether private content-private
context expressions are protected remains in doubt.
In some cases dealing with teacher dismissals wherein the speech
"See note 35, supra.
"Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966).
"See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); Cox v.
New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); Abbott v. Thetford. 534 F.2d 1101 (1976)
(reversing Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695 (1976) and adopting dissenting opinion of
Gewin, J. 529 F 2d at 706. regarding time. place, and manner generally).
"99 S. Ct at 696 n. 4
'Non-Partisan Freedom ol Expression. supra note 4. at 389-90 n. 99.
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involved was of a private content-private context nature, the courts
have upheld the dismissals finding that such expressions carry little
weight and require different consideration when applying the Picker-
ing balancing test.61 There are, however, a growing number of cases
holding that the first amendment is not always limited to issues of
public concern when statements are made in a private context."
Unfortunately, Givhan dealt with private content-public context
expressions, and therefore the Court had no reason to discuss private
content-private context expressions. It is evident that the law con-
cerning the rights of public employees is not yet standardized. One of
the problems is the number of variables to consider. Perhaps that is
why the Pickering Court demanded a case by case analysis6' and, for
the most part, established only general guidelines instead of clear cut
tests.
PICKERING DISRUPTION STANDARDS
The requirement of disruption in Pickering, however, is framed
stronger than a general guideline, and is more akin to the clear and
present danger test used in general free speech cases." Generally, an
"actual impairment" of a government interest is required.66 Likewise,
the disruption must be the result of more than the mere expression of
controversial ideas. 6' If strong standards like these were not required,
an intolerable chilling effect could result.6"
When attempting to determine the degree of actual disruption,
courts have had to consider a number of variables. The following
discussion deals generally with only a few of these factors. As this par-
ticular area of the law has a high degree of subjective impact, the
reader should bear in mind the enormity of the task the court faces
when presented with even a few of these variables.
"Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 25, 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977);
Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, at Indiana, 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975).
"See, e.g., Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Butler, 433 F.
Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1977).
6'391 U.S. at 569 (1968).
"Note, First Amendment Rights and Teacher Dismissal. A Survey; 4 OHIo NoRT.
L REV. 392, 401 (1977) [hereinafter cited as First Amendment Rights].
"Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression, supra note 4. at 380-82. The cases that
demonstrate actual disruption most clearly are symbolic speech cases. The case of
Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974), involved a V.A. psychologist
whose dismissal was upheld as he would not refrain from wearing a peace pin while
testing veterans. Another case, Phillips v. Adult Probation Dept., 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.
1974) involved a probation officer who was fired because he displayed a poster in his of-
fice which favorably depicted fugitives. It is obvious that the symbolic speech of these
two employees would severely interfere with their job performance.
"Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338, 349 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
"Because the Pickering balance is not a clear cut objective test, it may itself cause a
chilling effect, because it might be difficult for an employee to guess at the decision a
court would make. In such a situation, the employee may simply choose to remain
silent. See Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression, supra note 4 at 367, 370 n. 25.
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The effect of the expression on employer-employee relations is one
factor. One of the guidelines offered by Pickering in determining
disruption is whether "Ithe statements are in no way directed
towards any person with whom [the employee] would normally be in
contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher," 9 which could
lead to an impairment of the working relationship. If the working
relationship is impaired, then disciplinary or loyalty problems could
possibly result.
Disciplinary problems are probably the most common ground for
discharge of a public employee," but they usually arise as a real prob-
lem in speech cases only when there is a close working relationship.
For example, an employee of the Nebraska Department of Roads was
discharged when he said at a private meeting of engineers, that the
state engineer and director of the roads department were not
qualified. The district court held that his statement was not insubor-
dination, which is beyond first amendment protection, and because
there was no close working relationship involved, ordered his
reinstatement."
An employee's good faith criticisms standing alone will likely
find first amendment protection. If, however, abusive language or a
personal attack is involved, the balance may possibly fall in favor of
dismissal, as the employer-employee relationship could be severely
damaged. On the other hand, a caveat is in order, as care should be
taken to determine if the dismissal is due only to oversensitivity on the
employer's part." As so aptly stated by a noted authority: "[W]e must
be careful not to allow our natural sympathy for tender psyches to
beguile us into accepting serious erosion of the first amendment."
7'4
Yet if a close working relationship is significantly impaired, the fact
that the employer is overly sensitive may, in practical terms, mean lit-
tle.s In the final analysis, the determination will probably depend
largely on the closeness of the relationship.
Repeated criticisms, on the other hand, if taken to the point of ha-
rassment, may be considered to be conduct, and the speech involved
"391 U.S. at 569-70.
"See Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression, supra note 4, at 386.
"Nebraska Dept. of Roads Emp. Ass'n. v. Dept. of Roads, 364 F. Supp. 251, 255-56
(D. Neb. 1978).
"First Amendment Rights, supra note 65, at 404-05.
"See, e.g., Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ind.
1970) where the court found that a conflict was merely the result of the employer's
oversensitivitv.
"Haiman, supra note 51, at 199.
"See, e.g., Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1110 (10th Cir. 1974) (en bane). cert.
denied 420 U.S. 90 (1975); Note, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 234 (1975), where a teacher was
fired because he could not relate nor agree with the school president, the court held that
such a reason was not a permissible ground for firing him-but the decision was limited
to factual situations in which there is no close working relationship.
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will be assigned a secondary position. In this regard, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held in 1975 that while the first amend-
ment protects controversial ideas, it will not protect them if they are
forced upon others through harassment.70
The considerations may be altogether different, however, when
dealing with sensitive or high level positions, as courts have been in-
clined to strictly enforce loyalty in those situations. It is noteworthy in
regards to this comment, that when disloyalty is speech-related, it
generally surfaces via public comment." In fact, the Pickering Court
pointed out in a note, that even totally correct public statements could
possibly provide permissable grounds for dismissal in certain types of
public employment where the need for confidentiality is especially
great."
It is likewise possible that an expression made either publicly or
privately, could call into question an employee's fitness to perform his
job. Pickering mentioned this possibility and suggested that while
such expressions could be evidence of an employer's competence, the
statements could not be the sole basis for his dismissal.7" Expressions
made both publicly and privately have nonetheless been used as in-
dependent grounds for dismissal under the fitness argument."'
Basically, whether the speech involved is made in a public or
private context appears to be just another consideration. Like the
above mentioned variables, it is simply another piece of the factual
situation that must be weighed when employing Pickering and Mt.
Healthy. What Givhan adds is that a public employee may not be sub-
ject to sanction simply because he expresses himself privately when he
would not be subject to sanction for the same statement made public-
ly. The weight to be given any single variable will usually depend on
the circumstances.
It is in the area of "blowing the whistle" that a real difference be-
tween public and private context speech is noticed. Blowing the
whistle occurs when a government employee reports his superior or
" ray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir.
1975), where a teacher repeatedly and privately tried to convinv a pregnant student to
have an abortion.
"Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression, supra note 4, at 387-90.
1391 U.S. at 570 n. 3.
"ld. at 573 n. S.
"See Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1085 (5th Cir. 1976) in which the
court upheld denial of tenure to a teacher on the grounds that when he made false
statements and could have ascertained the truth, he demonstrated lack of character.
Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 445 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 1971) in which a legal aid
attorney privately made statements to the effect that because guilt was assumed when a
client pleaded guilty, the legal society should always take cases to trial. The court held
that the society could conclude from the statement that the attorney was unwilling to
implement society policies.
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another public employee for wrongdoing. One authority' suggests
that Swaaley v. United States, 2 which held that, "[a] petition ... ,
that has never left a Department, need do no harm," combined with
the holding in Pickering, indicates that statements suggesting wrong-
doing, even if false and defamatory, will be protected by the first
amendment if made privately and without intentional or reckless
disregard for the truth." Givhan clearly adds support to this position,
as does other caselaw. In Sprague v. Fitzpatricks" the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of an assistant district
attorney who publicly called into question the integrity of the district
attorney on the grounds that the statement was disruptive according
to the Pickering test. But in Ring v. Schlesinger,"' a teacher in a school
for Navy dependents was discharged when she sent a letter charging
her principal with incompetency to four persons in the chain of com-
mand. When she appealed from a summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that as she had
sent the letter to only four persons, and no apparent harm was shown,
the case was not subject to summary judgment. 8
CONCLUSION
The United States government employs more than eighteen per-
cent of the United States work force 7 and the areas of private employ-
ment where state action has been found to exist are ever increasing."8
The Givhan decision, thus, is potentially far reaching. But more
significant is the Pickering view, that the "threat of dismissal from
public employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting
speech." s 9 It is not unlikely, therefore, that if the Givhan Court had
held differently, a considerable chilling effect would have resulted.
Such a decision would have forced the public employee to decide
whether to remain silent or to go public in order for his speech to be
protected. That many such employees, if not the vast majority of
them, would choose to remain silent does not seem unlikely in a
society like ours where many persons actively avoid publicity.
Givhan's attorneys speculated as to what might happen in the
'Lindauer, Government Employees Disclosure of Agency Wrongdoing: Protecting
the Right to Blow the Whistle, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 530 (1975).
2376 F.2d 857, 863 (Ct. CI. 1967).
"See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"412 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
"502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"Id. at 490.
"See Non-Partisan Freedom of Expression, supra note 4, at 365 n. 1.
"See generally Note, State Action. Theories for Applying Constitutional Restric-
tions for Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. RE'. 656 (1974).
"391 U.S. at 574.
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event of an unfavorable ruling. They said, "the First Amendment
would not prevent a municipal government from revoking a citizen's
library privileges or trash collection services because he complained
to an official reasonably perceived by the citizen to be the appropriate
recipient of his complaint."' 0
We need not muse over the frightening possibilities, as the Givhan
decision was favorable. The decision was successful in closing up a
potentially serious loophole in this area of the law. What it proposes
in the way of a substantial addition to the law is, however, minimal.
The decision adds only another factor to consider among the great
many previously discussed. It is possible that Givhan appears to be a
landmark case because it shocks the conscience to think that such a
profound and basic issue has been overlooked for so long.
Upon reflection and consideration of the entire area of law upon
which Givhan impacts, the progress is apparent. The law has moved
with great strides from the time, not so long ago, when the public
employee sacrificed his constitutional rights for the privilege of serv-
ing the people.
Susan Fowler Brown
"Brief for Petitioner at 17, Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 99 S. Ct.
693(979).
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